- How do SOC analysts detect Boot or Logon Autostart Execution?
- Detection centers on XDR, SIEM telemetry for the persistence phase of the attack. Watch Sysmon Event ID 13 (RegistryEvent, Value Set) and Event ID 12 (key create and delete) where TargetObject contains \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or \RunOnce, the keys the SigmaHQ ASEP rule selects. Match on the path after the hive, since Sysmon abbreviates root key names (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE to HKLM, HKEY_USERS to HKU). Then read Image and Details: a command line pointing into AppData or Temp, written by powershell.exe or wscript.exe, is the alert. RunOnce values are deleted before their command runs, so by the time you look the key may be empty and only the Sysmon record shows what ran. Sysmon Event ID 11 (FileCreate) is the event Microsoft points to for autostart locations like the Startup folder. Cover both paths: C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup and C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp. A .lnk, .js, .vbs or .exe dropped there by an Office application or a script host is worth escalating.
- What does a Boot or Logon Autostart Execution alert look like?
- A representative XDR detection is "Malicious Registry Run Key Added" (high severity): Registry modification detected adding a new value to HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. The entry points to a file in %AppData%\Microsoft\Windows named svchost32.exe, which is not a legitimate Windows system file. The file was created 3 minutes prior by a PowerShell process with encoded command line arguments.
- Which tools detect Boot or Logon Autostart Execution, and how can I practice?
- Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (T1547) is best surfaced with XDR, SIEM telemetry, which exposes the persistence signals described above. Practice detecting it on those exact consoles in SOCSimulator Operations, free.