
Exposed .git Folder: Scanning the Web for Secrets
A public web server at Larkspur Logistics was deployed straight from a git checkout, leaving its .git directory exposed to the Internet. Following the EMERALDWHALE playbook, an attacker pulled /.git/config, stole the GitHub token baked into the clone URL, cloned the private repository, and found a hard-coded AWS key inside that handed them the cloud account. Walk the access, GitHub, and CloudTrail logs step by step to trace one misconfiguration into a full credential-theft chain.
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Investigation Tasks
Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.
Brief: a folder that should never have shipped
0Overnight, a public web server started handing out the contents of its hidden version-control folder to anyone who asked. Before you triage, orient yourself on how a single exposed file turns into a full cloud-account takeover.
Spot the dotfile that should have 404'd
15The scanner walked a list of hidden file paths looking for one the server would actually return. Most came back as not-found. Find the single path the server served instead, opening the whole chain.
Whose key did that one file give away
15The file the server handed over was tiny, but it leaked something valuable: a repository clone URL with a developer's access token embedded in it. Identify the account whose token was exposed.
Trace who used the stolen token
15The scanner that pulled that file was not the same machine that used the token. A different external address validated the credential and cloned the private repository. Identify it.
Find the cloud key hidden in the source
15Cloning the repo was not the prize. The attacker grepped the source for a hard-coded cloud key and found one that was still live. Identify the AWS access key that was used against the account.
Name the rogue account left behind
10With administrative access to the cloud account, the attacker created a new user to keep sending spam through the company's infrastructure. Priya needs the exact name to delete it. Identify the rogue IAM user.
Map the credential theft to MITRE ATT&CK
10Step back and label the heart of this incident. The attacker never exploited a software bug. They simply read a credential out of a file that was sitting in the open. Map that to MITRE ATT&CK.
7 tasks · 80 points total
Training Tools
Skills You'll Build
Ideal for newcomers to SOC operations. Guided investigation with clear indicators.
Prerequisites
- No prior experience required
- Familiarity with SIEM concepts
- Familiarity with Firewall concepts
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