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Anatsa Banker: The Trojan Hiding in a Google Play PDF Reader operation cover
BeginnerSIEMFirewall

Anatsa Banker: The Trojan Hiding in a Google Play PDF Reader

A relationship manager at Larkfield Mutual installs a five-star PDF and QR reader from the Google Play store onto her managed Android handset. It is an Anatsa (TeaBot) dropper: it stages a DEX payload disguised as an app update, sidesteps sandbox checks, downloads the final banking trojan, and abuses the Accessibility service to overlay a fake bank login. Walk the EMM/MDM and web-proxy logs step by step to trace the install, the staged downloads, the C2 callback, and the final payload.

20m
6 tasks
25 points
Free

Start this operation

Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Brief: a five-star PDF reader that was anything but

0

A relationship manager's corporate Android phone started talking to suspicious internet hosts this afternoon, shortly after she installed a new app from the Google Play store. Before you dig into the logs, get oriented on how this kind of attack works.

2

Name the app that started it all

15

The infection began when the victim installed a single app from the Google Play store. Identify the package name of the app that acted as the dropper.

SOC{com.vendor.appname}Hint available
3

Find the host the dropper phoned home to

15

Right after install, the dropper reached out to an internet host and pulled down files it did not ship with. Identify the domain it used for that staging.

SOC{domain.tld}Hint available
4

Fingerprint the final payload

15

After passing its sandbox checks, the dropper downloaded the final Anatsa banking trojan as an APK. Darius on the mobile security team wants the file's MD5 hash so he can hunt for it across the rest of the fleet. Find it.

SOC{md5hash}Hint available
5

Spot the command-and-control callback

15

Once the trojan was running, it registered the infected phone with its operators over a connection that should never come from a managed handset. Identify the IP address the trojan first registered with.

SOC{a.b.c.d}Hint available
6

Map this chain to MITRE ATT&CK

10

One move in this chain is the reason every other move was possible: when the store inspected this app, the part that does the harm was not there to be found. Give the MITRE ATT&CK Mobile technique that names that move.

SOC{Txxxx}Hint available

6 tasks · 70 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
SIEM log analysis
Firewall log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Beginner

Ideal for newcomers to SOC operations. Guided investigation with clear indicators.

Prerequisites

  • No prior experience required
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts
  • Familiarity with Firewall concepts

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