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FluBot: The Parcel-Delivery Text That Spreads Itself operation cover
BeginnerSIEMFirewall

FluBot: The Parcel-Delivery Text That Spreads Itself

A managed Android handset at Larkfield Mutual is infected by FluBot after the employee taps a smishing SMS impersonating a DHL parcel-delivery notice. The fake tracking page talks the user into installing an app and granting it Accessibility and SMS permissions; from there the trojan turns the phone into a sender, harvesting the contact list, texting the same lure onward and intercepting bank 2FA codes, while keeping a command channel the perimeter firewall never blocked. Walk the mobile telemetry and firewall logs step by step to trace the lure, the sideload, the contact theft, the SMS worm, and the hidden C2.

15m
6 tasks
25 points
Free

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Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Brief: a parcel text that texts itself

0

A managed company phone started sending text messages of its own this morning, after its owner tapped a parcel-delivery link. Before you dig into the logs, get oriented on how this kind of mobile malware works.

2

Find the link the victim tapped

15

The whole infection began with one text message containing a web link disguised as a parcel-tracking page. Find the domain that link pointed to.

SOC{host.domain.tld}Hint available
3

Name the app that was sideloaded

15

Tapping the link led to an app download from outside the managed store. Identify the exact filename of the package that landed on the phone.

SOC{filename.apk}Hint available
4

Spot where the stolen contacts went

15

Once installed, the trojan read the entire contact list and reached out to its command server to send them off. Identify the command-and-control domain it contacted.

SOC{domain.tld}Hint available
5

Measure how far it tried to spread

10

FluBot's signature behavior is turning a victim into a sender. The handset began blasting the same lure to its own contacts. Determine how many messages it sent in that burst.

SOC{number}Hint available
6

Label how the C2 stayed hidden

10

The firewall never blocked the command-and-control traffic because of how the trojan disguised it. Map that evasion technique to MITRE ATT&CK.

SOC{Txxxx}Hint available

6 tasks · 65 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
SIEM log analysis
Firewall log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Beginner

Ideal for newcomers to SOC operations. Guided investigation with clear indicators.

Prerequisites

  • No prior experience required
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts
  • Familiarity with Firewall concepts

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