
Finance Mailbox Takeover at MegaCorp Logistics
A finance analyst at MegaCorp Logistics reported that colleagues were receiving replies to messages she never sent, and her account was disabled while the investigation runs. You have the SIEM feed and the endpoint XDR telemetry for the workstation estate and the mail platform, covering the week around the report. Reconstruct what happened: which host produced the endpoint evidence, what its browser reached, how the account was taken over, and what was left behind on the mail platform so the containment plan is complete.
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Investigation Tasks
Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.
Scope the Compromised Endpoint
5The case opened as a mailbox compromise on a finance analyst's account. Before tracing how the intrusion unfolded you need to scope it: which internal workstation produced the endpoint telemetry behind this incident? Work the SIEM around the automation binary that ran during the browser session and read the host it was recorded on.
Trace the Outbound Connection
10Having scoped the affected workstation, follow what its browser did during the window in question. Shortly after the user opened a downloaded file, the host opened an HTTPS connection to an external host. Work the XDR timeline and network events and identify the external destination the browser connected to.
Classify the First Detection
5The connection you traced raised a detection on the affected host in the XDR Behaviors panel. Report the MITRE ATT&CK technique ID the platform mapped to that detection.
Classify the Second Detection
5A second detection fired on the same host a few minutes after the first, on the artifact the browser was holding at that point. Determine the MITRE technique ID the platform assigned to it.
Name the Adversary's Objective
5You have now mapped two related techniques on this host. In the ATT&CK model both roll up under a single tactic that describes the adversary's goal in this phase of the intrusion. Report that shared tactic.
Identify the Delivered File
10With the endpoint activity understood, trace back to how it started. A file arrived by email and was opened from the user's Downloads folder shortly before the browser session. Correlate the inbound mail event with the process that opened the download and identify that file.
Identify the Launching Process
5Opening that file was followed by a headless automation binary running on the same host. Walk the XDR process tree on the affected workstation and determine which immediate parent process launched that binary.
Classify the Mail Server Detection
5You have reconstructed how the account was taken over; now establish what was left behind for the containment plan. One detection fired on the mail server against the victim's mailbox after the account was reached. Report the technique name the platform assigned to it.
8 tasks · 50 points total
Training Tools
Skills You'll Build
Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.
Prerequisites
- Basic understanding of security alerts
- Familiarity with SIEM concepts
- Familiarity with XDR concepts
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