
Scattered Spider: Identity-First Attack Chain
Investigate an identity-first intrusion by Scattered Spider (UNC3944) at a telecom provider. A file-share lure and a burst of MFA prompts hand the operators a service-desk lead's session; by evening a remote-support client she was talked into installing gives them a SYSTEM shell, from which they load a vulnerable signed driver to tamper with the endpoint sensor and replicate the domain's credentials. Correlate Entra sign-ins, endpoint telemetry and domain controller logs to rebuild the chain from the first click to the upload, and decide which evidence still holds once a sensor has been tampered with.
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Investigation Tasks
Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.
Investigating the Credential Dump on the Domain Controller
10The case opened on a late-evening identity alert with Scattered Spider (UNC3944) tradecraft suspected: corp-wks-8821 authenticated to the domain controller corp-srv-ad01 as the backup service account svc_backup and requested directory replication. In the baseline that account only ever authenticates to the domain controller from the backup server, and replication is requested only by the directory synchronisation account. The workstation belongs to amanda.garcia, who had locked her session and left hours earlier. Work the process telemetry on corp-wks-8821 around that logon and identify the Impacket script that performed the credential dump.
Fingerprinting the Operator's Kernel Driver (BYOVD)
10Before the credential dump, a driver-mapping utility (kdmapper.exe) ran on corp-wks-8821 as SYSTEM. Tools of this kind exist to get unsigned kernel code past Driver Signature Enforcement: they borrow a legitimately signed but vulnerable third-party driver for kernel access and use it to map a second driver that Windows would otherwise refuse to load (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver). Two driver files touched disk in that sequence. Identify the operator's own driver, the one that was staged in advance and handed to the mapper as its argument, and report its SHA-256.
Naming the Vulnerable Driver Loaded as a Kernel Service
10The mapper cannot reach the kernel by itself. One second after it started on corp-wks-8821 it wrote a legitimately signed but vulnerable third-party driver to disk and registered it as a temporary kernel-mode service. Using the Service Control Manager record and the file activity in the driver-loading sequence, report the file name of that signed vulnerable driver.
Identifying the Interpreter Behind the Dump
10The Impacket script from the first task is not an executable. On corp-wks-8821 it was run by an interpreter that the operator unpacked into a staging folder under C:\ProgramData minutes earlier, not by anything installed for the user. Identify the interpreter image that executed the script.
Tracing the Shell Back to the Remote-Access Tool
10Every hands-on step that night (the driver mapper, the interpreter, the archive and the upload) was typed into one SYSTEM command shell on corp-wks-8821. Scattered Spider (UNC3944) operators usually get that shell from a commercial remote-management product, not from malware. Walk the process lineage upward from the driver mapper and report the remote-access service binary that spawned the shell.
Which Sensor Component Was Tampered With
10The purpose of the driver mapping was to blind endpoint protection, not to persist. Seconds after the vulnerable driver loaded, the endpoint detection product on corp-wks-8821 reported that one of its own kernel components had been modified in memory, and its next health check-in reported degraded integrity. Identify the security-agent driver that was tampered with.
Tracing the Origin of the Kernel-Mode Driver Load
10During later driver-mapper activity on corp-wks-8821, SIEM records include the telemetry provider that reported the process start. Examine the event metadata and determine which source or log provider reported the activity.
The Domain Behind the Remote-Access Install
10Step back to how the remote-access service reached the workstation. Earlier that evening amanda.garcia downloaded and ran an installer package, and the service it created began resolving a name that no sanctioned IT tooling uses. Review the DNS activity from corp-wks-8821 in that phase and report the domain the installer came from and the new service called home to.
Investigating the Remote-Access Channel
10After the driver-mapping activity, the rogue remote-access service on corp-wks-8821 re-opened its outbound session to operator-controlled infrastructure. Analyze the endpoint's network telemetry and report the destination IP address of that command-and-control channel.
Phishing Reconstruction: The Sign-In Proxy
10Finally, establish how Scattered Spider (UNC3944) obtained amanda.garcia's session in the first place. That afternoon she followed a link from a file-share notification and entered her credentials on a page that relayed them to the real identity provider, after which a burst of MFA prompts ended in one approval. Identify the adversary-in-the-middle domain her browser authenticated through.
10 tasks · 100 points total
Training Tools
Skills You'll Build
Complex multi-stage investigations. Realistic noise, ambiguous indicators, lateral movement.
Prerequisites
- Basic understanding of security alerts
- Experience with log analysis tools
- Familiarity with SIEM concepts
- Familiarity with XDR concepts
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