
Volt Typhoon: living-off-the-land in critical infrastructure
No malware, no ransomware, no payload to scan for, just native Windows binaries used in an abnormal sequence and a stolen administrator credential. A stealth operator plants a tiny web shell on a water utility's internet-facing host, dumps LSASS with a signed system DLL, routes C2 through a compromised home router, and exports the entire Active Directory database off the domain controller before clearing the logs. Work the Windows Security log, the endpoint process tree, and the perimeter traffic to separate the living-off-the-land activity from a heavy baseline of legitimate admin work.
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Investigation Tasks
Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.
Find the quiet way in
50A water-utility SOC flagged off-hours activity on an internet-facing host, but there is no exploit and no failed-login storm to anchor on. Work the web and identity records and identify the host where the intrusion took hold.
Name the planted page
55The operator's command channel is a single file hiding in plain sight among legitimate application pages. Identify the server page that was planted to run commands.
Catch the credential dump
60Before touching the directory core, the operator harvested credentials from memory on the foothold host using nothing but a built-in component. Identify the signed system DLL that was abused to read the credential process.
Trace the disguised channel
65Command-and-control never went straight to a data-center IP, it was relayed so the egress looks like home internet. Pin down the external address the relay forwarded traffic to.
Identify the directory theft
65The decisive move was lifting the entire domain credential store off the controller without any malware. Determine which host the Active Directory database was exported from.
Spot the cover-up
50Before disengaging, the operator tried to erase the trail on the foothold host. Pin down the exact time the Security audit log was wiped.
Classify the credential-store theft
55Summarize for the incident report how the operator obtained every domain credential at once. Map the directory-database theft to its MITRE ATT&CK sub-technique.
7 tasks · 400 points total
Training Tools
Skills You'll Build
Complex multi-stage investigations. Realistic noise, ambiguous indicators, lateral movement.
Prerequisites
- Basic understanding of security alerts
- Experience with log analysis tools
- Familiarity with SIEM concepts
- Familiarity with XDR concepts
- Familiarity with Firewall concepts
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