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The Template That Read the Disk operation cover
BeginnerSIEMFirewall

The Template That Read the Disk

The file-transfer portal that Tideglow Logistics' partners upload to spent a morning returning host files it was never meant to publish, and finished it running an administrator session nobody had logged into. The root cause is CVE-2024-4040 in CrushFTP 10.6.0. Walk the access logs and firewall traffic step by step to trace how a client holding no credentials turned a request parameter into a read of the host, and that read into a takeover.

25m
6 tasks
25 points
Free

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Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Brief: when a file server reads its own secrets

0

The file-transfer portal our partners upload to started serving files that have nothing to do with file transfer this morning. Before tracing it, get oriented on the class of flaw you are about to walk through.

2

Spot the template-injection payload

20

Several requests that morning were not asking for files the portal owns. One of them actually read a file off the host. Find it in the access log and submit the exact string that was placed in that request's path parameter.

SOC{<TAG>/path</TAG>}Hint available
3

Find the file that gave up the session tokens

15

Reading a host file proved the attacker could reach outside the portal's own area. The next read went after something far more useful to them. Name the file that was pulled.

SOC{filename.ext}Hint available
4

Trace where the admin session was replayed from

15

Not every request that morning came from the same place. Submit the address that was using the stolen session.

SOC{a.b.c.d}Hint available
5

Name the account the attacker became

10

Once the stolen session was replayed, the portal itself answered the question of whose session it was. Read the evidence and name that account.

SOC{username}Hint available
6

Map the initial access to MITRE ATT&CK

10

Step back from the individual requests and label how the attacker first got in. Give the ATT&CK technique ID for that first step.

SOC{Txxxx}Hint available

6 tasks · 70 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
SIEM log analysis
Firewall log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Beginner

Ideal for newcomers to SOC operations. Guided investigation with clear indicators.

Prerequisites

  • No prior experience required
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts
  • Familiarity with Firewall concepts

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