
Automated Transcript: A Voicemail From Your Own Domain
A voicemail notification from your own company's domain, with an SVG attached. In mail, endpoint and proxy logs, read the delivery record instead of the From line, see why an image can be code, then find who got it, who opened it, who reached the page and whether anyone fell.
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Investigation Tasks
Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.
Who Really Sent It
10On Wednesday 26 August Harriet Cole, practice manager at Marlowe Street Dental, reported an email that looks like a voicemail from the practice's phone system, subject "Automated transcript". The From line shows the practice's own domain, but the sender typed it; the delivery record is what the mail service saw. Submit the IP address of the server that delivered it.
An Image That Is Code
10At 09:47 Zainab Malik on reception double-clicked the attachment in her copy, a file named like a recording with a play symbol and a duration. Each copy of this campaign is built for its recipient, so every copy is a different file. Submit the SHA-256 of the copy Outlook saved on her workstation.
Who Else Got It
10Before anyone is phoned, the SOC needs the size of the problem. The campaign changes the subject, the sender address and the file for every recipient, but the mail service groups messages from one campaign under one EmailClusterId. Using Wednesday morning's delivery records, count how many of the practice's mailboxes received this fake voicemail, the reporter's included.
Who Opened It
10This email has no link, so the click log stays empty: the only trace of an open is on the endpoint. When someone double-clicks an attachment, Outlook starts a program with the cached file in its command line. Read the process starts Outlook made this week and count how many people opened a copy of the fake voicemail.
Who Reached the Page
10The script in the file showed no link: seconds after the file opened, it moved the browser to a web page by itself. The web proxy logs every page the practice's computers fetch. Find where the fake voicemail sent the people who opened it, and notice what the page's address carries. Submit the host name of the page.
Did Anyone Fall
10Reaching the fake sign-in page is not handing over a password. Had anyone typed a password into the pre-filled form, their browser would have sent a form back to that host. Read every request the visitors' machines made to that host, and their sign-ins later that day. How many of them submitted anything back to the page?
Shut the Door
10The next wave will bring new servers, senders and files; the page they lead to stays the same. Containment: purge every copy, Deleted Items included; block the page and its address at the edge; remove the rule letting the practice's own domain skip filtering, and fix the booking system's SPF. Submit the IP address to block at the edge.
7 tasks · 70 points total
Training Tools
Email Console
Email header & content analysis
SIEM Console
Log analysis & SPL queries
XDR Console
Endpoint detection & response
Skills You'll Build
Ideal for newcomers to SOC operations. Guided investigation with clear indicators.
Prerequisites
- No prior experience required
- Familiarity with Email concepts
- Familiarity with SIEM concepts
- Familiarity with XDR concepts
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