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Call This Number: The Debt-Relief Email With Nothing to Click operation cover
BeginnerEmailSIEM

Call This Number: The Debt-Relief Email With Nothing to Click

A debt-relief email with no link and no attachment, only a phone number. Step by step, find the sender, the number, who else got it, who called, what was taken and whether the caller rang back, using the delivery records and the call logs.

45m
6 tasks
25 points
Free

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Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Who Sent It

10

At 14:05 on Wednesday 19 August, Jon Alvarez, a producer, calls the IT desk: a "Hardship Relief Program" email asked him to phone a number about his debts, he heard a sales pitch and hung up after 41 seconds. Start with the sender. Submit the address in the From line of the message.

SOC{address}Hint available
2

Nothing to Click

10

Deanna Ruiz in claims got the same debt-relief callback campaign message. With no link and no file, every filter let it through. What it carries is the one thing it asks you to do. Read her copy and submit the phone number as digits and dashes, without the parentheses.

SOC{phone}Hint available
3

Who Else Got It

10

One person called IT, but before anyone is told to stop, the SOC needs the size of the problem. Each copy greets its recipient by first name, so each is a separate message, all from the same mailbox with the same subject. Count how many of the agency's mailboxes received it.

SOC{number}Hint available
4

Which Extension Dialled

10

Jon said he called the number. Did anyone else? Every Teams Phone call to an outside number leaves a call record, and agents ring Dallas numbers all day. Match the email's number against Wednesday's outbound calls and submit the caller number of the extension that stayed on the line longest, as the record stores it, with the leading +.

SOC{e164}Hint available
5

What Was Taken

10

The call record names who owns the extension you found. The call left no content behind, so look at what that person did right after it. Read the payroll portal requests, the files Edge saved and the outbound mail, and submit the name of the file that left the agency, with its extension.

SOC{filename}Hint available
6

Did It Call Back

10

IT purged every copy at 14:52 and blocked the sender, but the caller has a direct number into the agency and agreed to call back. Before the line is blocked, read Wednesday's inbound calls and submit the time the message's number rang the agency, in UTC as the call record shows it, as HH:MM with the seconds dropped.

SOC{HH:MM}Hint available

6 tasks · 60 points total

Training Tools

Email Console

Email header & content analysis

SIEM Console

Log analysis & SPL queries

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
Email log analysis
SIEM log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Beginner

Ideal for newcomers to SOC operations. Guided investigation with clear indicators.

Prerequisites

  • No prior experience required
  • Familiarity with Email concepts
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts

Ready to investigate?

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