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Rhysida Ransomware: Healthcare Network Intrusion operation cover
AdvancedSIEMXDRFirewallPRO

Rhysida Ransomware: Healthcare Network Intrusion

A Rhysida ransomware affiliate phishes a healthcare staff member's VPN credentials and exploits a stale MFA exemption to breach a regional medical center. Using a Cobalt Strike beacon and built-in Windows tools, the attacker extracts all domain credentials, exfiltrates patient records for double extortion, and deploys the encryptor estate-wide. Trace the kill chain from the first failed VPN login to the final ransom note.

1h 30m
7 tasks
150 points
Pro

Start this operation

Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Establish the entry point

40

Before the clinical network can be trusted again, you need to know exactly how the attacker got in. The incident started with a remote-access session that should not have been permitted. Work out which account was used and why the normal second-factor check did not stop it.

Hint available
2

Attribute the first successful tunnel

40

The account that got in had two failed attempts before it succeeded. Separate those from the background of normal staff VPN sessions and identify the external address that established the malicious tunnel.

Hint available
3

Find the credential theft method

50

Once on the domain controller, the attacker extracted every domain password hash in a way that avoided touching the process most EDRs watch. Identify the ATT&CK technique that describes this method.

Hint available
4

Locate the command-and-control channel

45

The attacker ran a persistent beacon on the jump host throughout the intrusion. Pinpoint the external address it was calling home to.

Hint available
5

Track the data out

45

Before the encryptor ran, a large outbound transfer moved patient records off the network. Identify the external IP address that received the stolen data.

Hint available
6

Name the privileged account used post-DC

45

After extracting domain credentials from the DC, the attacker began moving laterally with a different account. Identify that account.

Hint available
7

Classify the pre-encryption disruption

50

In the hour before encryption, the attacker ran a sequence of operations designed to ensure recovery would be impossible. Identify the MITRE ATT&CK technique that covers the core goal of that sequence.

Hint available

7 tasks · 315 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
SIEM log analysis
XDR log analysis
Firewall log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Advanced

Complex multi-stage investigations. Realistic noise, ambiguous indicators, lateral movement.

Prerequisites

  • Basic understanding of security alerts
  • Experience with log analysis tools
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts
  • Familiarity with XDR concepts
  • Familiarity with Firewall concepts

Ready to investigate?

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