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Shiesty Remcos: PO Phish to RegAsm Hollowing operation cover
IntermediateSIEMEmailXDRFirewallPRO

Shiesty Remcos: PO Phish to RegAsm Hollowing

A procurement coordinator opened a purchase-order phishing attachment and a finance workstation went quiet, then started beaconing over encrypted traffic. Follow the chain from a sender-spoofed email through an Excel macro, a VBS loader, a fileless PowerShell download, and a hollowed, signed .NET system utility to the Remcos RAT's dynamic-DNS command-and-control.

1h
7 tasks
50 points
Pro

Start this operation

Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Open the case

0

A procurement workstation tripped the endpoint console mid-morning with an Office-spawns-script alert, and the SOC has pulled the mail, endpoint, and perimeter telemetry for the host. Get oriented before you start pivoting.

2

Trace the delivery

20

The trail starts in the mailbox. One inbound message carried a weaponized purchase-order attachment that failed sender authentication. Establish who sent it.

Hint available
3

Recover the dropped loader

20

Enabling content did not run the payload directly. The workbook macro wrote a small script to the user profile and handed off to a Windows script host. Recover the file it ran.

Hint available
4

Find the staging host

20

The script host launched a hidden PowerShell that reached out to the internet to pull its real payload. Identify the external host it downloaded from.

Hint available
5

Find what is wearing a disguise

20

To survive inspection, the payload was not launched as a new executable. It was hidden inside a legitimate, signed Windows binary that was started suspended and overwritten. Identify the process it took over.

Hint available
6

Cut off the channel

20

The disguised process reached out to attacker infrastructure to take orders and ship stolen data over an encrypted channel. To contain the host, identify the command-and-control host it beaconed to.

Hint available
7

Classify the evasion

20

For the report, classify the core evasive move the attacker used to run a commodity remote-access tool under a trusted name. Map it to its MITRE ATT&CK technique.

Hint available

7 tasks · 120 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
SIEM log analysis
Email log analysis
XDR log analysis
Firewall log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Intermediate

Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.

Prerequisites

  • Basic understanding of security alerts
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts
  • Familiarity with Email concepts
  • Familiarity with XDR concepts
  • Familiarity with Firewall concepts

Ready to investigate?

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