
UNC6384: Captive-Portal PlugX Implant
A diplomat's managed laptop on an untrusted conference network has its captive-portal check hijacked and is steered to a page posing as a security update. The download is a signed Canon utility paired with a malicious DLL: running the trusted binary side-loads the DLL, which runs PlugX in memory, beacons to a single HTTPS host, and sets a Run key. Reconstruct the chain from the proxy, Sysmon, endpoint, and firewall evidence.
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Investigation Tasks
Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.
Orient on the traveling-laptop alert
0A diplomat's managed laptop on a conference network started making outbound connections that do not match the user's normal traffic, minutes after a captive-portal sign-in. Before pivoting through the evidence, get oriented on what you are looking at and which surfaces hold the answers.
Find where the captive-portal check was redirected
15The intrusion began when the laptop's connectivity check was tampered with on the untrusted network. Trace the proxy and DNS records from the connectivity probe to the attacker page and identify the host the browser was steered to.
Identify the malicious DLL that was sideloaded
15The attacker page delivered a bundle built around a trusted, signed application. The dangerous component is not the signed executable but the file loaded beside it. Use the endpoint and Sysmon evidence to name it.
Classify the execution technique
15Put a name to how the attacker got code to run inside a trusted, signed process. Map the technique you just reconstructed to MITRE ATT&CK.
Pin down the command-and-control host
15Once loaded, the implant ran in memory and reached out to its operator. Separate that callback from ordinary encrypted browsing and identify the single external host it used.
Locate the persistence mechanism
15The actor wanted the foothold to survive a reboot. Using the Sysmon and endpoint records, identify the registry value the loader wrote so it would relaunch automatically.
Classify how the data left the machine
15Wrap up by mapping the exfiltration to MITRE ATT&CK. The implant did not build a separate upload site: the data left over the channel it was already using.
7 tasks · 90 points total
Training Tools
Skills You'll Build
Ideal for newcomers to SOC operations. Guided investigation with clear indicators.
Prerequisites
- No prior experience required
- Familiarity with SIEM concepts
- Familiarity with XDR concepts
- Familiarity with Firewall concepts
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