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IntermediateSIEMFirewall

Overnight on the DMZ Wiki

Quillon Software publishes its engineering wiki straight to the internet from the DMZ. Overnight the host picked up work nobody rostered: requests that never authenticated, shell activity under a service account, and outbound sessions from a server that normally only talks to its update mirrors. Work the web access logs, the Linux audit trail and the perimeter egress, and reconstruct what reached the host and what left it.

50m
6 tasks
50 points
Free

Start this operation

Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Find the foothold

20

Before any data moved, someone reached the public Confluence wiki without ever logging in. Work the Confluence/Tomcat access logs and isolate the external address behind the unauthenticated requests that carried injected code in the URL.

SOC{a.b.c.d}Hint available
2

Identify the running identity

15

The injected code did not run as a person, it ran as whatever account the wiki application itself runs under. Identify the service account the executed commands ran as on the host.

SOC{accountname}Hint available
3

Name the planted webshell

20

For durable access the attacker did not add a new file that would stand out, they overwrote one that already shipped with the product. Identify the legitimate Confluence file that was overwritten with a webshell.

SOC{filename.ext}Hint available
4

Expose the credential theft

20

With code execution in hand, the attacker went after the credentials the wiki itself stores. Identify the file on disk where the harvested credentials were staged before they left the host.

SOC{filename.ext}Hint available
5

Trace the exfiltration

20

The staged credentials left the building. Correlate the host egress with the perimeter traffic and identify the external address that received the exfiltrated data.

SOC{a.b.c.d}Hint available
6

Classify the access

10

No credential was phished and no endpoint was infected, the attacker abused the internet-facing application itself. Map the initial breach to its MITRE ATT&CK technique.

SOC{Txxxx}Hint available

6 tasks · 105 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
SIEM log analysis
Firewall log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Intermediate

Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.

Prerequisites

  • Basic understanding of security alerts
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts
  • Familiarity with Firewall concepts

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