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Trusted Tool, Hostile Hands: Atera RMM Foothold operation cover
IntermediateXDRSIEMEmailPRO

Trusted Tool, Hostile Hands: Atera RMM Foothold

A phishing-delivered intrusion that weaponized a legitimate remote-monitoring tool instead of custom malware. A finance analyst was lured by a grant-program email whose link pointed at a file-sharing platform; the download was an MSI that silently installed the Atera agent, registered the endpoint to an attacker-controlled tenant, persisted as a Windows service, and beaconed to Atera's cloud over HTTPS. From the vendor console the operator ran PowerShell discovery and staged a follow-on implant, all over trusted infrastructure. Reconstruct the chain from email, SIEM, and endpoint XDR telemetry and classify the key ATT&CK techniques.

55m
7 tasks
50 points
Pro

Start this operation

Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Incident brief

0

Orient yourself before pivoting into the data. This is a no-answer briefing checkpoint.

2

Trace the delivery

35

Every later event traces back to one message. Identify exactly how the payload was delivered to the user.

Hint available
3

Recover the installer indicator

35

Pin down the file-level indicator for what the user actually ran so it can be hunted. Provide the SHA-256 of the installer.

Hint available
4

Classify the persistence

30

The agent did not just run once; it made sure it would survive a reboot. Classify how persistence was established.

Hint available
5

Name the implant

30

The operator used no custom malware. Identify the legitimate tool that became the implant.

Hint available
6

Find the operator's hand

35

The agent calls a trusted cloud, but a human drove it. Identify the external IP the operator controlled the agent from.

Hint available
7

Recover the staged next stage

35

Before the session ended the operator left something behind for the next stage. Identify the file they staged and ran.

Hint available

7 tasks · 200 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
XDR log analysis
SIEM log analysis
Email log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Intermediate

Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.

Prerequisites

  • Basic understanding of security alerts
  • Familiarity with XDR concepts
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts
  • Familiarity with Email concepts

Ready to investigate?

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