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GCP Service Account Key Abuse: IAM Privilege Escalation operation cover
IntermediateCloudSIEMPRO

GCP Service Account Key Abuse: IAM Privilege Escalation

A developer committed a GCP service account JSON key to a public repository and an attacker found it within hours. Work the GCP Cloud Audit Logs to trace how the leaked credential was turned into a full IAM privilege escalation and a bulk download of the production secrets vault.

45m
7 tasks
50 points
Pro

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Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Locate where the credential surfaced

15

Before the cloud logs show any attacker activity, a monitoring system flagged a problem. Identify the GCP service account whose JSON key was found exposed in a public code repository.

Hint available
2

Confirm the stolen key identifier

15

GCP service account JSON files contain a key_id field alongside the private key. Identify the specific key_id that was leaked and subsequently used by the attacker.

Hint available
3

Trace the initial external operator

20

The SA key was activated from outside the corporate network. Find the external IP address from which the attacker first generated a GCP access token using the leaked credential.

Hint available
4

Reconstruct the escalation event

25

After enumerating IAM state, the attacker performed a critical privileged operation on the project itself rather than on the service account. Identify the GCP Cloud Audit Log method that describes modifying a project's IAM policy.

Hint available
5

Name the attacker's foothold identity

20

The SetIamPolicy event added a new principal to the project. Identify the service account the attacker placed into a privileged role on the project.

Hint available
6

Identify the primary data target

20

After establishing elevated access, the attacker turned to data. Identify the Cloud Storage bucket they enumerated and downloaded objects from first.

Hint available
7

Map the credential access technique

20

The initial access in this incident did not involve a password spray, phishing email, or software exploit. It relied on a credential that was already public. Identify the MITRE ATT&CK sub-technique that describes harvesting credentials from files.

Hint available

7 tasks · 135 points total

Training Tools

Cloud Console

Cloud infrastructure logs

SIEM Console

Log analysis & SPL queries

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
Cloud log analysis
SIEM log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Intermediate

Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.

Prerequisites

  • Basic understanding of security alerts
  • Familiarity with Cloud concepts
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts

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