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Cisco IOS XE Web UI: Implant and Rogue Admin (CVE-2023-20198) operation cover
IntermediateSIEMFirewall

Cisco IOS XE Web UI: Implant and Rogue Admin (CVE-2023-20198)

The Cisco IOS XE Web UI management interface on AXFORD-RTR-01 was inadvertently exposed to the internet. An attacker exploited CVE-2023-20198 to create an unauthenticated privilege-15 local account, then chained CVE-2023-20273 to drop a Lua implant on the device flash filesystem. The implant hooked the HTTP server and beaconed to an external C2 address. Reconstruct the full compromise chain from the router syslog and the perimeter firewall.

40m
6 tasks
50 points
Free

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Investigation Tasks

Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.

1

Establish the exposure vector

15

The edge router management interface was reachable from the public internet. Before examining the exploit chain, establish the exact TCP port that was exposed.

SOC{port}Hint available
2

Find the initial access source

20

Two external addresses from the same subnet probed the router before anything was written to the device. One performed reconnaissance only; the other triggered account creation. Identify the exploit source.

SOC{a.b.c.d}Hint available
3

Name the rogue account

25

The first exploit stage created a privileged local account on the device without any legitimate administrator action. Identify the account name from the device logs.

SOC{username}Hint available
4

Identify the implant

20

After account creation, the attacker used a second exploit to write a persistent file to the router filesystem. Name the implant file from the device logs.

SOC{filename.ext}Hint available
5

Map the persistence technique

20

The implant embedded in the router HTTP server provides the attacker with durable access that survives configuration restarts. Map the persistence mechanism to its MITRE ATT&CK technique identifier.

SOC{Txxxx}Hint available
6

Trace the implant callback

25

Once installed, the implant initiated outbound contact to confirm persistence and receive tasking. Identify the external C2 IP address it contacted.

SOC{a.b.c.d}Hint available

6 tasks · 125 points total

Training Tools

Skills You'll Build

Investigate realistic security alerts
SIEM log analysis
Firewall log analysis
MITRE ATT&CK® technique identification
Triage decisions: escalate, investigate, or close
Evidence collection and documentation
Job-ready incident response methodology
Intermediate

Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.

Prerequisites

  • Basic understanding of security alerts
  • Familiarity with SIEM concepts
  • Familiarity with Firewall concepts

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