AsyncRAT: Malvertising to Trojanized Installer
An IT admin searching for a remote management tool clicks a paid search advertisement and downloads what appears to be a legitimate installer. The ZIP contains an AutoIt-compiled fake setup executable that drops a PowerShell loader, which fetches AsyncRAT from a staging server. The RAT establishes persistence via a scheduled task and beacons to a C2 server. Correlate web proxy records, Windows event logs, XDR file and process artifacts, and firewall egress traffic to trace the full chain from malvertising lure to active command-and-control.
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Investigation Tasks
Complete each task by investigating alerts and submitting your findings.
Trace the sponsored result that started the chain
25An IT admin's workstation is generating unusual outbound traffic. Start at the web proxy to establish how the incident began and identify the download that kicked it off.
Name the fake installer that ran on the endpoint
25The downloaded ZIP contained a fake RMM installer. Use the XDR file artifacts to identify the executable that was extracted from the archive and run by the victim.
Trace the loader chain through the process tree
25The fake installer spawned a hidden PowerShell process that reached out to a staging server. Read the process tree to identify the PowerShell command line and the staging IP it contacted.
Identify how AsyncRAT survives a reboot
25After dropping the RAT binary, the attacker installed a persistence mechanism so the malware runs automatically after each logon. Use the SIEM event logs to identify what was created.
Locate the AsyncRAT command-and-control server
25The RAT binary has been launching and maintaining a persistent connection since the scheduled task first ran it. Use the firewall logs to identify the C2 IP address it is beaconing to.
Map the persistence technique to MITRE ATT&CK
25The attacker chose a specific persistence method. Classify it using the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
Confirm the RAT binary with its hash
25Tie together your findings so far. Provide the SHA-256 hash of the AsyncRAT binary that was written to AppData and is now persisting on the endpoint.
7 tasks · 175 points total
Training Tools
Skills You'll Build
Requires foundational alert triage skills. Multiple data sources to correlate.
Prerequisites
- Basic understanding of security alerts
- Familiarity with XDR concepts
- Familiarity with SIEM concepts
- Familiarity with Firewall concepts
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