Event 4698 belongs to the Audit Other Object Access Events subcategory, which covers scheduled tasks, COM+ objects and indirect object access requests. Microsoft rates its volume as low and recommends Success auditing for domain controllers, member servers and workstations, citing the scheduled task events first. That makes this one of the cheaper audit settings to turn on everywhere. The event fires every time a new task is created, whether by schtasks.exe, the Task Scheduler console, a script, or an installer.
The fields are short. The Subject block names the requesting account and its SubjectLogonId. TaskName is written as \task_path\task_name, counted from the Task Scheduler Library node. TaskContent is the whole task definition as XML, which is where the analysis happens. Windows 10 1903 and later add five more fields: ClientProcessStartKey, ClientProcessId, ParentProcessId, RpcCallClientLocality and FQDN. The process fields name the client that asked the scheduler to create the task, which earlier builds never recorded, and the sample on this page includes them.
Read the XML in four places. Triggers say when the task runs: at logon, at boot, on a schedule. Principals say as whom: UserId, LogonType and RunLevel. Actions say what runs: an Exec element with a Command and Arguments. Settings can mark the task Hidden. Microsoft's guidance picks out two cheap checks. Alert when TaskContent contains LogonType Password, because the account password is then stored in Credential Manager in cleartext and an administrator can extract it. And look at tasks whose TaskName sits in the root of the library, written as \NAME, because tasks created manually or by malware often land there. Built-in tasks live in subfolders such as \Microsoft\Windows, so a root-level name that imitates a Windows component stands out.
Three identities appear in one record, and they do not have to match. The Subject is who asked the scheduler to create the task. Author in RegistrationInfo is what the task claims. UserId in the principal is the account it will run as. A standard user who creates a task that runs as a more privileged principal, or a task whose RunLevel is HighestAvailable, calls for review. Microsoft's two samples show the difference on a single line: the 4698 sample runs with LeastPrivilege and the 4702 sample with HighestAvailable.
The sample combines the flags. Account a.chen creates \WindowsUpdateCheck, a root-level name that borrows a Windows word, triggered at logon, running C:\ProgramData\Updates\winupd.exe -s, hidden, under a Password logon type. Any one of those could be innocent. Together they describe persistence (MITRE T1053.005, Scheduled Task), and MITRE also notes the scheduler can be abused for remote execution as part of lateral movement. When the creation is remote, the SubjectLogonId belongs to a network logon, so the 4624 for that ID gives you the source address.
The family sits on this page because the four events share a Subject block, a TaskName and a detection design. 4699 records a deleted task and includes the TaskContent of the task that no longer exists, so it doubles as a recovery of the definition. Microsoft notes the event does not happen often, and that deleting a task from the library root can be a sign of malicious activity. 4700 records a task being enabled, and its counterpart 4701, disabled, is listed on the same Microsoft subcategory page. Watch the pair for critical tasks that should never change state, and for dormant tasks that wake up weeks after creation. 4702 records an update and carries only TaskContentNew, the new definition. There is no old copy in the event, so you compare against the last 4698 or 4702 for the same TaskName.
That last point matters for rule design. A detection that only watches 4698 misses an attacker who edits an existing, trusted task and swaps its command. Microsoft applies the same LogonType Password check to updated tasks, and your Exec-path rule should run on 4702 as well as 4698.